Order 1 Rule 15 of the National Court Rules 1983 is the provision most often relied on by a party who has run out of time.
(1) The Court may, on terms, by order extend or abridge any time fixed by the Rules or by any judgement or order.
(2) The Court may extend time under sub-rule (1) as well after as before the time expires, whether or not an application for the extension is made before the time expires.
(3) The period within which a person is required by these Rules or by any order to serve, file or amend any pleading may be extended by consent without an order for extension.
Sub-rule (2) — the important half
The Court may extend time as well after as before the time expires, and whether or not the application is made before the time expires.
Those words are deliberately emphatic. Under some procedural systems an expired time cannot be revived, and a party who misses a deadline is simply out. Sub-rule (2) removes that risk in the National Court.
But being able to apply is not the same as succeeding. The Court will want to know:
- How long the delay was;
- Why it occurred — and an explanation is expected, not optional;
- Whether the other party is prejudiced, and whether any prejudice can be met by costs;
- Whether the party has an arguable case on the underlying issue.
Shortening time
The Court may abridge time as well as extend it. That is what makes urgent applications possible.
Where an injunction is needed within days, the applicant will typically seek orders abridging the time for service of the notice of motion, and may combine that with dispensation under Order 1 Rule 7.
Sub-rule (3) — no order needed
The period within which a person is required to serve, file or amend any pleading may be extended by consent, without an order for extension.
Sub-rule (3) is confined to pleadings — serving, filing or amending them. It does not let parties agree to extend time for anything else: not for discovery, not for appealing, not for compliance with a specific order that fixes a date.
Two practical points:
- Record the consent in writing. An oral agreement is worth little if the other side later denies it and applies for default judgment.
- Consent does not bind the Court’s listing. Parties who agree repeated extensions may still find the proceeding at risk of dismissal for want of prosecution.
Remember too that Order 2 Rule 3(3) already stops the clock for pleadings during the vacation from 20 December to 31 January.
What Rule 15 cannot extend
Sub-rule (1) reaches “any time fixed by the Rules or by any judgement or order”. A time fixed by statute is outside it.
| Time limit | Source | Extendable? |
|---|---|---|
| Time to file a defence | National Court Rules | Yes — O 1 r 15, or by consent under r 15(3) |
| Limitation period for a claim | Frauds and Limitations Act 1988 | No — not by rule of court |
| Six-month notice to the State | Claims By and Against the State Act 1996 s 5(2) | Yes, but only under that Act — by the Principal Legal Adviser or the court, on sufficient cause being shown |
| 40 days to file an election petition | Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections | No |
| Four months for judicial review | National Court Rules O 16 r 4 | Yes — the rule itself allows a good reason for delay |
| 40 days to appeal a Family Court decision | Lukautim Pikinini Act 2015 s 115(2) | No — not by National Court Rules |
Before assuming a deadline can be extended, ask where the deadline comes from. If it is in the Rules or in an order of the Court, Rule 15 is available and retrospective extension is possible. If it is in an Act or an Organic Law, look for an extension power in that Act — and be prepared to find there is none.
Where the difficulty is that no time is fixed at all, the answer is Order 1 Rule 16, under which the Court may by order fix the time.
Extending time by agreement
The Rules allow the parties themselves to extend certain pleading periods by consent, in writing, without an order. In a case where both sides simply need more time, that is a considerable economy.
Where the extension is substantial, or where the other side may later dispute it, convert the agreement into a consent order. That makes the new date a time fixed by an order — unambiguous, enforceable, and itself extendable under Rule 15 if necessary.
An informal agreement between lawyers does not of itself prevent default judgment being entered. In practice a plaintiff who signs judgment after agreeing to an extension can expect it to be set aside with costs against them — but the defendant will still have had to make the application, and pay for it in the meantime.
What an application should show
- The source of the time limit — the rule, judgment or order fixing it. This establishes that Rule 15 reaches it at all.
- Why the time was not met, deposed to by someone with direct knowledge.
- A specific new date, not an open-ended request.
- The absence of real prejudice, or an offer to meet the costs thrown away.
Apply by notice of motion citing Order 1 Rule 15, supported by an affidavit. Because the power is expressly retrospective, being out of time is no bar — but promptness counts, and delay after the difficulty became apparent is the point most often taken against an applicant.
Sources
- National Court Rules 1983 — O 1 rr 7, 13–16; O 2 r 3; O 12 Div 3; O 16 r 4
- Frauds and Limitations Act 1988
- Claims By and Against the State Act 1996 — s 5
- Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections
Before relying on anything here, read the current text of the National Court Rules 1983 and check for later amendments. If a decision matters to you, get advice — start with the Office of the Public Solicitor, or find a firm in the law firms directory.