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Can I Go to Court to Enforce the National Goals?

Not directly — section 25(1) makes them non-justiciable. But three exceptions turn the Goals into a working legal tool, and section 22 gives the National Court a power most litigants never use.

The Constitution series, no. 3 · Preamble, National Goals and Basic Social Obligations · 4 min read

People read the National Goals, recognise a promise their community has plainly not received, and ask the obvious question: can I sue? The honest answer is no — not on the Goals alone. But that is not the end of it, and the reasons why repay understanding.

What “non-justiciable” means

Section 25(1) of the Constitution says the National Goals and Directive Principles are non-justiciable, except to the extent provided in subsections (3) and (4).

Non-justiciable means a court will not entertain a claim whose cause of action is a breach of the Goals. A writ pleading “the defendant failed to promote integral human development” discloses no reasonable cause of action and will be struck out. The reason is institutional rather than dismissive: the Goals set political and developmental objectives whose achievement depends on budgets, priorities and choices that belong to Parliament and the Executive, not to a judge.

Common mistake

Adding “and contrary to the National Goals and Directive Principles” to a statement of claim adds nothing and can invite a strike-out application. Plead the enforceable right — a Basic Right, a statutory duty, a contract — and use the Goals to shape how the court reads it.

Exception 1: the duty on governmental bodies

Section 25(2) says that nevertheless it is the duty of all governmental bodies to apply and give effect to the Goals as far as lies within their respective powers. The duty is real; the difficulty is that section 25(1) removes the ordinary route to enforcing it directly.

Where it bites is in administrative law. A decision-maker who fails to consider a matter they were bound to consider may have made a reviewable error. Where a statute or policy directs attention to the Goals, section 25(2) supplies a strong argument that they were a mandatory relevant consideration.

Exception 2: the rule of construction in section 25(3)

This is the most useful of the three. Where any law, or any power conferred by any law — legislative, judicial, executive or administrative — can reasonably be understood, applied, exercised or enforced in a way that gives effect to the Goals, or at least does not derogate from them, without failing to give effect to the intention of Parliament or to the Constitution, then it is to be read and enforced in that way.

Note the structure. It does not let a court rewrite a clear statute. It operates where two or more readings are genuinely open — which, in practice, is very often. Where a discretion is broad, section 25(3) tells the decision-maker which way to lean.

Exception 3: the Ombudsman Commission and leadership tribunals

Section 25(4) removes non-justiciability altogether for the Ombudsman Commission and any other body prescribed for the purposes of the Leadership Code. Those bodies shall take the National Goals and Directive Principles fully into account in all cases as appropriate.

So conduct by a leader that is inconsistent with the Goals — particularly Goal 3, which requires leaders to ensure their freedom to decide is not restricted by obligations to others and to make all decisions in the national interest — is squarely within the Commission’s remit.

The provision people forget: section 22

Section 22 is short and unusually powerful. Constitutional provisions that recognise rights of individuals, or that confer powers or impose duties on public authorities, shall not be left without effect because of the lack of supporting machinery or procedural laws. Where machinery is missing, the lack is to be supplied, as far as practicable, by the National Court — expressly “in the light of the National Goals and Directive Principles”, and by analogy from other laws, general principles of justice and generally-accepted doctrine.

In other words: “there is no procedure for that” is not an answer in a constitutional matter. The court makes one, guided by the Goals. Section 23 then supplies sanctions where a Constitutional Law prohibits an act or imposes a duty and no other enforcement is provided — the National Court may impose imprisonment of up to ten years or a fine of up to K10,000, or order compensation where no other equally effective remedy exists, and make any further order it thinks proper.

How to use the Goals in a real case

  1. Find the enforceable hook — a Basic Right under section 57, a statutory duty, a decision open to judicial review.
  2. Identify the ambiguity — the competing readings of the section or the breadth of the discretion.
  3. Deploy section 25(3) — show which reading gives effect to the Goals, and that it does not defeat Parliament’s intention.
  4. If procedure is missing, cite section 22 — and ask the National Court to supply it.
Check the section yourself

Constitutional sections are amended. Before relying on anything here, read the current text: the Constitution on PacLII. If a decision matters to you, get advice — start with the Office of the Public Solicitor.

Disclaimer: This article provides general information about Papua New Guinea law and does not constitute legal advice. Laws may change, and their application depends on individual circumstances. You should obtain professional legal advice for your specific situation. Read the full disclaimer.